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ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO
FAIR REPRESENTATION: THE MIRANDA CASE
In Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,' the Third Circuit declared
that an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice by discharging
"an employee for a good reason, a poor reason, or no reason at all" 2 pro-
vided the discharge was unrelated to union activity. Miranda Fuel Co.
3
gave the National Labor Relations Board an opportunity to decide whether
a union's similarly arbitrary treatment of a member for reasons unrelated
to union membership 4 is also not an unfair practice.
I. THE EXTENT OF UNION POWER OVER WORKERS' RIGHTS
Collective bargaining agreements, often referred to as "industrial legis-
lation," 5 prescribe detailed rules for the employment relationship, typically
controlling wages, working conditions, and criteria for gaining and main-
taining employment.6 Both in creating and in administering these agree-
ments, decisions by labor unions bind individual workers. Under section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act 7 the majority union is the
exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate collective bar-
gaining unit.8 After the union has consummated the collective bargaining
agreement, its influence over working conditions continues through its
power to process individual grievances 9 and perhaps through its main-
1138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943) (dictum).
2 1d. at 90.
3 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, No. 26232, 2d Cir., Dec. 11, 1963.
4 140 N.L.R.B. at 197 (dissenting opinion).
5 See, e.g., Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 805,
815 (1951); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Re-
sponsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1331 (1958).
6 Thus, by ruling that shops may hire no new workers until employees formerly
laid off are rehired, a union can restrict entry into a trade.
749 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
8 Normally an employer cannot separately contract with an individual worker,
even to grant him specially favorable treatment. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332, 338 (1944).
9 The good faith determination of whether or not to process a grievance is the
prerogative of the union, since the promises in the collective bargaining contract to
negotiate grievances run only between union and employer. Black-Clawson Co. v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Ostrofsky v. United
Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 790 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960). See generally Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor
Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 ARE. J. (n.s.) 3 (1954).
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tenance of hiring halls "I or its power over seniority rights."1 The union's
power to collect and disburse funds also necessarily affects each member.
Investigations have revealed that occasional abuses of union power
have rendered individual workers helpless victims of arbitrary treatment.'
2
Since the power of a statutory bargaining agent is derived largely from
legislation,13 governmental authority might be expected to insure its fair
exercise. But attempts to protect individual workers must balance the
individual's claim to impartial treatment and the political,' 4 social, and
legal ' pressures against regulating unions.
Some governmental safeguards against unfair representation have
indirectly protected individual rights by insuring a democratic atmosphere
in unions. For many years state courts have remedied arbitrary disciplin-
ing of members,' 6 ordered accountings of funds,1 7 and required and super-
10 Obtaining workers through union hiring halls is common in the trucking and
shipping industries, or wherever labor is only temporarily employed. The legality of
these balls, if operated in a nondiscriminatory manner, was affirmed in Local 357,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). See generally Rothman,
The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring Hall Arrange-
inents, 48 VA. L. REV. 871 (1962).
"1 See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
12 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947). This Senate Investigation
Committee found many cases of union threats and reprisals coercing employees. In-
vestigations of union corruption led to the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §401(b) (Supp. I, 1959) [hereinafter
cited as LMRDA]; see S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings
Before the Select Committee of the Senate on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1957).
13 Under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, a majority union is the
statutory representative of all members of the bargaining unit. 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958). The union's position is strengthened by
other legislation, such as the general prohibition of injunctions against labor unions,
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958), the pro-
hibition against elections within one year after a prior election, 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1958), and the requirement that an employer
recognize a union for a "reasonable time" after certification, Brooks v. NLRB, 348
U.S. 96 (1954).
14 Total membership in American labor unions was 18.1 million in 1960. STEIN-
BERG, THE STATESMAN'S YEARoor, 625 (1963). Political education and political
"action" committees focus the political responses of these workers. Unions have been
understandably opposed to governmental regulation of their internal affairs.
15 American jurists have traditionally avoided interference with the internal
workings of nonprofit organizations. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associ-
ations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. Rxv. 993 (1930).
1 See, e.g., Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918) (reinstatement
of employees denied a fair hearing) ; Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833
(1931) (reinstatement of members expelled for suing union officers); Savard v.
Industrial Trades Union, 76 R.I. 496, 505, 72 A.2d 660, 665 (1950). See generally
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J.
175 (1960). The theory of these suits usually equates a union constitution with a
contract between union and members. Thus, an equity court enforcing this contract
is fulfilling its traditional role of protecting property rights. However, a court may
also hold a union constitutional provision invalid as against public policy. Spayd v.
Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Ati. 70 (1921).
17 Probably the most famous situation involving an accounting of funds con-
cerned the fight of a minority in a local of the hod carriers union against an entrenched,
corrupt leadership. The New York Supreme Court, Ulster County, required both
an accounting and elections in this controversy in Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35,
29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct 1941) ; see LABOR RELATiONS AND THE LAW 95-102 (Wollett
& Aaron, 2d ed. 1960). See also Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d 575
(1952).
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vised elections for union officers.' 8 In addition, many states have dealt with
the internal affairs of unions by legislation, some with objectivity and
others with obvious antiunion overtones.' 9 More recently the federal
government embarked upon statutory regulation of internal union affairs in
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.20 Although
this act seeks to protect individual rights primarily by compelling report-
ing 2  rather than by direct regulation, it also safeguards union democracy
in a bill of rights of union members that is enforceable by civil suit.
22
Before this legislation, a frequently employed protection for individual
workers had been judicial enforcement of the "right to fair representation."
In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,23 the Supreme Court recognized an
action by a nonunion member of a bargaining unit against the majority
representative under the Railway Labor Act to enjoin the performance of
a collective bargaining agreement which discriminated against the plaintiff
because of his race. Holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to grant
the injunction, the Court reasoned that a duty of "fair representation"
accompanied union powers delegated by the act.24 The Steele doctrine has
been extended to unions operating under the National Labor Relations
Act 25 and to unions which had obtained representative status from the con-
sent of every member of the bargaining unit rather than by majority vote
as described in the statute.26 Moreover, the doctrine has generated causes
of action for both equitable and compensatory relief in cases of discrimina-
18 See, e.g., Sibilia v. Western Elec. Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A.2d
251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 348
Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944); Wilson v. Miller, supra note 17. See generally Cox,
The Role of Law in Preseruing Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 609, 624-27
(1959).
19 Many of these acts prohibit interference with the right to join a labor union
by discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or like ground. E.g., Colorado Labor
Peace Act, CoLo. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-1 (1953). Some detailed statutes regulate
elections, dues, and reports concerning union finances. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 447.01-447.15 (1952); Tax. Ray. Civ. STAT. art. 5154a (1962). See also N.Y.
LABOR LAW §§ 720-32. State statutes apparently motivated by anti-union animus as
well as by a desire to improve union democracy may be thwarted by federal preoccu-
pation of the field. See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). See
generally Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I,
44 ILL. L. REv. 425 (1945).
2OLMRDA, 73 Stat 519-41 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).
21LMRDA §§201-10, 73 Stat 524-30 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (Supp. I,
1959).
22LMRDA §§101-05, 73 Stat. 522, 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§411-15 (Supp. I,
1959).
23323 U.S. 192 (1944).
24 Id. at 199-202.
25 See Syres v. Oil Workers' Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1956), reversing per
curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955) ; cf. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255
(1944) (dictum).
26 In Syres v. Oil Workers' Int'l Union, supra note 25, the circuit court had relied
on the reasoning of Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1952), that if all in the proper unit were members of the union,
that union did not derive its authority as representative from § 9 of the NLRA so
that the Steele reasoning did not apply.
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tion for other than racial reasons, 27 and unions encounter the duty of fair
representation in the execution, as well as in the creation, of collective
bargaining agreements.
28
The National Labor Relations Board has also encouraged "fair
representation" by threat of decertification 29 on the theory that the Board
may police its own grants of authority.30 Although the Board has in fact
decertified an unfair union to insure future bargaining freedom, 3 ' the
mere threat of decertification usually suffices.
The effectiveness of the presently available remedies for unfair repre-
sentation is questionable because of the delay, cost, and complexity of
judicial enforcement and the likely failure of actual decertification to aid
a persecuted minority unless it gains majority status in the unit.3 2  One
possible solution is to invoke the government prosecuting machinery as
well as the relative speed, flexible proof procedures, and expert knowledge
of the NLRB to enforce directly the union duty of fair representation
under its power to prevent unfair labor practices.33
II. UNFAIR REPRESENTATION AS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Miranda Case
Because many of the Miranda Fuel Company's truck drivers were
not needed during the slack summer season, the collective bargaining
agreement permitted drivers whose low seniority ranking did not entitle
them to work during the summer to have a leave of absence from April 15
until October 15. The contract expressly preserved the seniority rating
of drivers returning by October 15, and the company agreed to accept the
union's certification that a driver returned in time to retain his seniority
rights. Lopuch, a worker with sufficient seniority to work during
2
7 Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.
1953); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952) (dictum).
28 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (selective refusal to process grievances);
Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra note 27 (failure to protect
seniority rights). But see Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F.
Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (internal management of union funds); Bohannon v.
Reading Co., 168 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (union negligence).
2 E.g., Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953) ; Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B.
804 (1944); Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945) (dictum).
30 Hughes Tool Co., supra note 29, at 321-22. See also Cramp Shipbuilding Co.,
52 N.L.R.B. 309 (1943). See generally Aaron and Komaroff, supra note 19, at 439-42.
31 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955) (union refused to bar-
gain for nonunion members in the bargaining unit). See also 20 NLRB AxN. REP.
18 (1955).
32 See Syres v. Oil Workers' Int'l Union, 223 F.2d 739, 747 (5th Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion), rev'd, 350 U.S. 892 (1956).
33 Cf. Syres v. Oil Workers' Int'l Union, supra note 32, at 741. Compare Welling-
ton, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal
System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1351 (1958), with Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regu-
lation of Internal Union Affairs-II, 44 ILL. L. REv. 631, 669 (1949). Professor
Cox has suggested that a union's unfair representation may constitute a refusal to
bargain collectively in violation of § 8(b) (3) of the act. Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 V.L. L. Rav. 151, 173 (1957).
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the summer, was nonetheless granted a personal leave of absence by the
employer from April 12 to October 12 in order to help his widowed
sister-in-law. His return to work was delayed until the end of October
because of illness, but the union admitted that his late return did not
justify a reduction in seniority. However, under pressure from other em-
ployees the union caused the employer to drop Lopuch to the bottom of
the seniority list for leaving work three days before April 15. Lopuch
complained to the National Labor Relations Board. Nothing in the record
indicates that the union's action was designed to discipline Lopuch for
conduct related to his union membership.
The original Board decision held 34 that the delegation of the em-
ployer's power over seniority to the union resulted in company
3 5 and
union 31 violations of the National Labor Relations Act.
3 7 Under the same
sections of the act, the Board alternatively held that the company and
union discriminated against the complaining worker by reducing his
seniority for a reason unauthorized by the contract" The April 15 date
in the contract did not bind Lopuch since he left pursuant to a special leave
of absence granted by the employer and not because he lacked employment
opportunity. Therefore, the Board found that the union request was arbi-
trarily based on the whims of other union members. The Second Circuit
enforced the order on the narrow ground that union reduction of seniority
for a reason not authorized by the contract unlawfully discriminated
34 Miranda Fuel Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 454, 455 (1959).
35 Section 8(a) :
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization ....
National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1958).
36 Section 8(b)
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7 of this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discrimi-
nate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such or-
ganization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . ..
National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1958).
37 The Board relied on its prior holding in Pacific Intermountain Express, 107
N.L.R.B. 837, 844-45 (1954), enforced, 228 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955), that delegating
to the union any power to determine senority is per se illegal.
38 125 N.L.R.B. at 455-57,
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against the worker to encourage union membership.3 9 The Supreme Court,
at the request of the NLRB,40 remanded the case to the Board 4 1 for
further consideration in light of its decision in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB 42 that hiring halls are not illegal per se.
On remand,43 the Board acknowledged that the employer's delegation
of power over seniority to the union was not illegal per se. However, the
majority now held that the arbitrary reduction of seniority by the union
violated sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2), and that the company trans-
gressed sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) by its participation.
The Second Circuit,44 in a two-to-one decision, denied enforcement of
the Board's order. Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Medina agreed that
the evidence was insufficient to find the discrimination needed to support
violations of sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3), since the parties might in
good faith have viewed their actions as within the contract provisions.
Only Judge Medina considered the workers' right to "fair representation"
and regarded it as not protected by sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(1)
against union and employer interference.
B. The Board's Finding of 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) Violations
The Board asserted that since section 9 requires unions to represent
employees fairly,45 section 7 "gives employees the right to be free from
unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining
agent in matters affecting their employment." 46  Therefore, the Board
found that by treating the complaining employee unfairly the union had
violated section 8(b) (1) (A) ,47 which prohibits labor unions from restrain-
ing employees' exercise of section 7 rights.48 Moreover, although the duty
39 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960). The Second Circuit
had previously rejected the Board's per se rule of Pacific Intermountain Express.
Local 553, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1959).
40 See NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., No. 26232, 2d Cir., Dec. 11, 1963, at 377.
41 Local 553, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 763 (1961) (per curiam).
42365 U.S. 667 (1961). This decision overruled the Board's Mountain Pacific
doctrine that all hiring halls are unlawful unless specified contractual guarantees
against discrimination are publicized to prospective employees. Mountain Pacific
Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957). See generally Note, 70 YALE L.J. 661 (1961).
4 3 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
44 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., No. 26232, 2d Cir., Dec. 11, 1963.
45 See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
46140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
47 Id. at 185, 190.
48 Should the Board's decision in Miranda fail to win ultimate acceptance, the
General Counsel has suggested another theory to support an 8(b) (1) (A) violation
in situations like Miranda. Hughes Tool Co., Case No. 23-CB-429, discussed in
Address by Stuart Rothman, General Counsel of the NLRB, Before Labor Law
Section of Wisconsin Bar Association, Feb. 15, 1963. The Hughes case involved
a union refusal to process an employee's grievance because of his race. The General
Counsel reasoned that this arbitrary action coerced the employee's exercise of his
protected right to process a grievance. Id. at 15. This argument is difficult to accept.
Although employees have a statutory right to process grievances, or to engage in
any other collective activity, free from employer coercion, Bowman Transp. Inc.,
134 N.L.R.B. 1419, 1426 (1961), enforced on this ground, 314 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.
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of fair representation does not directly bind an employer, the Board in
Miranda predicated the employer's violation of section 8(a) (1) wholly on
his participation in the union's interference with the employee's right to
fair representation.4 9
The dissenters to the NLRB opinion denied that an unfair labor
practice was involved. But even assuming that unfair representation may
be an unfair labor practice, they balked at the threshhold finding of
arbitrary discrimination in Miranda.50 Their dispute, however, may not
involve the factual determination so much as the permissible scope of
inquiry. They would distinguish the arbitrary action in Miranda from
clearly antisocial discrimination, such as that based on race.51 A similar
distinction underlies the reluctance of federal courts to enforce a union's
duty of fair representation under the Steele 52 doctrine when the alleged
unfairness is less blatant than discrimination based solely on race or union
activity.53 Language in Steele compares the union's duty with the obliga-
tion of evenhandedness imposed by the equal protection clause on state
legislation.54 Following this analogy, courts have accorded unions a
presumption of fairness similar to that given state legislatures.55 However,
everyday union decisions are not analogous to state legislation, and judicial
self-restraint in finding discrimination may merely demonstrate that courts
are institutionally ill-suited to distinguish between fair and unfair treat-
ment in a complex industrial context.56  If the Board is to enforce em-
1963), the union may exercise reasonable discretion in determining not to press all
grievances against the employer, see Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers,
171 F. Supp. 782, 790 (D. Md. 1959). Therefore, at most the employee's right
against the union might be to have the union review his grievance fairly. But if
this right to fair representation is found in § 7, a similar gloss would apparently
attach to union representation in any collective activity. The General Counsel's
indirect theory in Hughes thus seems essentially identical to Mirandds direct incor-
poration of a general right to fair representation into § 7.
49 140 N.L.R.B. at 185-86.
50 140 N.L.R.B. at 200.
5 Ibid.
52 See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
53 In Colbert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 941 (1954), the court refused relief under Steele against an
allegedly unfair senority agreement. Relying on Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1952), the court allowed a wide range of reasonableness to the statutory
bargaining agent in serving the unit it represents. The court continued:
We think appellants fail to appreciate the essential difference between
the suit laid in the complaint and cases wherein collective bargaining agree-
ments containing invidious proscriptive factors that are inimical to statutory
or constitutional right, such as racial discriminations, are presented to the
court. . . . Seniority among railway workers is fundamentally and wholly
contractual and it does not arise from mere employment and is not an in-
herent, natural or constitutional right.
206 F.2d at 13. See also Napier v. System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' Dep't, 127
F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Ky. 1955) ; Pellicer v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 118 F. Supp.
254 (S.D. Fla. 1953), affd, 217 F.2d 205 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955).
54 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
55 See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1339-42, 1357 (1958).
56Id. at 1357-58.
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ployees' rights to fair representation, its habitual close examination of
subtle factual issues would probably impel it to discard the Steele doctrine's
limits on the judicial scope of inquiry. However, the resultant intrusions
upon numerous aspects of union self-government that are presently regu-
lated in less detail would significantly alter the statutory authority of
unions without specific legislative authorization.
Neither the plain meaning of section 7 nor its legislative history
suggests a congressional intent to include a right to fair representation.
The terms of section 7 guarantee the employees' right to organize, bargain
collectively, and engage in other collective activity.5 7 All of these rights
involve employees' action in concert with other workers to increase their
bargaining power vis-A-vis employers; none seems addressed to union
interference with equal rights within employee organizations. Moreover,
the legislative history confirms that section 7's statement of labor's right to
bargain collectively was originally designed exclusively to mitigate the
disparity in bargaining power between individual workers and corporate
employers, a particularly grave inequity during the Great Depression.
58
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, enacted specifically to rectify the prevailing
economic imbalance of power,59 generally immunized workers' collective
activities from injunctions, 60 which previously had posed an insurmountable
obstacle to labor's self-organization. Shortly thereafter, the National
Industrial Recovery Act established the statutory right of employees to
self-organization(61 in language similar to the subsequent National Labor
Relations Act, but weak enforcing agencies destroyed the act's effec-
tiveness. 62 The National Labor Relations Act, attempting to remove this
weakness,63 recognized employees' right to act collectively in section 7 and
secured it by prohibiting employer interference in section 8 (1)." Congress
was preoccupied throughout this period with the encouragement of collec-
57 "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities . . . . " National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49
Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
58 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1935).
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to promote the free flow
of commerce by reducing industrial strife. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49
Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
59 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
60 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
61 "Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such repre-
sentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " National Industrial
Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a)(1), 48 Stat. 198 (1933).
62 See Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 75 (1963).
63 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1935) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9683-84
(1935) (remarks of Representative Connery).
64 Ibid.
[Vo1.112:711
FAIR REPRESENTATION
tive bargaining; it never purported to regulate unions' control over
individual workers.
The 1947 amendments to the NLRA extended the NLRB's unfair
labor practice jurisdiction for the first time to violations by unions.6 The
bill reported out of the Senate Committee prohibited only union interference
with the employer's selection of his own representatives.6 6 A minority of
the committee, led by Senator Taft, objected that the prohibition was too
limited 67 in light of the many instances of union coercion and intimidation
of employees that investigations had revealed.68 This group concluded
that, once the bill established the principle of union unfair labor practices,
unions should be subject "to the same rules as the employers." 6
With this objective in mind, Senator Ball proposed an amendment that
was essentially adopted as the present section 8(b) (1) (A), prohibiting
unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights. The legislative history stresses precise correlation of
union unfair labor practices with the corresponding regulation of employer
interference with section 7 rights.7" Since section 8(a) (1) does not
prevent arbitrary employer discipline that is not motivated by an em-
ployee's union status,71 the union's similar activity does not seem within the
proscription of section 8(b) (1) (A).
This legislative development belies the Board's assertion in Miranda
that section 8(b) (1) (A) circumscribes union activities more narrowly than
section 8(a) (1) restricts employers.72 In asserting that the act imposes
65 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), added by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)-(7) (Supp.
IV, 1963).66 This bill would prohibit unions from interfering with an employer's right to
join employers' associations or from compelling employers to discharge their labor
relations representatives. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947).
67S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947).
68 See generally Hearings on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
69 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
70 "[T]he purpose of the amendment . . . . is to insert an unfair-labor practice
for unions identical with the first unfair labor practice prohibited to employers in
the present act .... " 93 CONG. REc. 4016 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball). (Em-
phasis added.)
Arguably the act applies a less stringent restriction on unions than on employers,
because it prohibits only union activity that "restrains" or "coerces" employees,
whereas it prohibits employer activity which merely "interferes" with the exercise
of § 7 rights. See NLRB v. Drivers Local Union 639 (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274,
285 (1960) ; cf. 93 CONG. REc. 4019-22 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ives). Compare
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1958), with National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (1) (A), added by 61
Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958). However, employer
interference that did not also restrain and coerce had never been held illegal and the
Conference Committee's elimination of the word "interference" in § 8(b) 1(1) (A)
merely codified the long-standing interpretation of § 8(a) (1). H.R. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947). See also International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961).
71NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937); see 140
N.L.R.B. at 184-85.
72140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
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different duties on unions and employers, the Board apparently rests on
the union's duty of fair representation as developed by the Steele doctrine
under section 9 of the act.73 This union duty has no counterpart among
employer duties. Section 9, however, does not automatically permeate all
provisions of the act, including section 7. Steele, under the Railway
Labor Act, predicated the grant of equity relief on the absence of adminis-
trative or other remedies,74 a necessary precondition to the exercise of
general equity powers. The adoption in Syres v. Oil Workers' Intl
Union 75 of the Steele gloss into the National Labor Relations Act, accom-
plished in a per curiam reversal on the authority of Steele and its Railway
Labor Act progeny, presumably relied on the nonexistence of an adminis-
trative remedy for unfair representation,7" even though the general concept
of union unfair labor practices had been in the act for several years.
Steele doctrine cases under the National Labor Relations Act subsequent
to Syres have also intimated that unfair representation alone cannot
support a Board action.77 Similarly, these cases until recently have not
suggested complete preemption of the judicial cause-of action for unfair
representation, 78 a result that would probably attach if section 7 embodied
a right to fair representation, since the current preemption rule precludes
judicial jurisdiction of any action even arguably subject to the unfair labor
practice jurisdiction of the NLRB. 79 The unarticulated premise of this
73 Ibid.
74 See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 193, 207 (1944).
75 350 U.S. 892 (1956), reversing per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
76 Cf. 223 F.2d at 747 (dissenting opinion).
77 See, e.g., Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 314 F.2d 690, 692 (9th Cir.
1963); Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653, 655 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
But cf. Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 369 & n.6 (1964) (semble).
78 See, e.g., Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, supra note 77, at 692; Duran-
detti v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 77, at 655. But cf. Humphrey v. Moore, supra
note 77, at 369 & n.6 (sevnble). Compare Humphrey v. Moore, supra note 77, at 377
(separate opinion of Harlan, J.) (reserving judgment on the preemption question);
Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696 (1963). See
also Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICE. L. REv. 1435 (1963) ;
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L.
Rv. 563, 610 (1962).
79 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959);
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
The Court has consistently held that federal preemption does not prevent state
action to prevent or remedy acts of violence. International Union, UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958) (suit for damages) ; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957) (suit for injunction); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351
U.S. 266 (1956) (suit for injunction). This exception at one time seemed based
on a distinction between the Board's remedies and those available in the courts. See
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621 (1958). But the
majority's language in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra at 247-48,
has limited this exception to cases involving actual or threatened violence. But
see id. at 249-54 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Local 100, United Ass'n of
Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 696-97 (1963). In state causes of action the
policy of primary jurisdiction is reinforced since congressional intent to provide
a uniform and exclusive remedy may completely preempt the application of state law
to the merits. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra at 499-501; DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAw TEXT § 19.04 (1959).
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judicial development is that Steele doctrine cases are not cognizable by the
Board.
A preference for judicial safeguards against unfair representation also
characterizes legislative consideration of the problem, even though the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 empowered the NLRB to regulate certain unfair
practices of unions.80 The 1947 Congress intentionally rejected an amend-
ment to the NLRA that would have directly enforced workers' rights to
fair representation by a section 8 unfair labor practice proceeding. In the
House, the Hartley Bill emerged from committee with a new section 7(b),
which guaranteed union members certain freedoms from unfair treatment
by their union.81 Although this section 7 right would have concentrated
on impartiality in internal union management, it apparently would also have
encompassed the right to be free from union unfair conduct involving
employer participation against individual employees-the right that the
Board majority now finds in section 7. Yet this broad amendment to
section 7 was expressly rejected by the Conference Committee and the
more restricted Senate amendment 8 2 was adopted.8 3  Furthermore, the
years immediately after the passage of Taft-Hartley witnessed the unsuc-
cessful introduction of several bills designed to insure fair treatment of
members by regulating the internal affairs of unions 4  When Congress
finally did regulate unions' internal activity in the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,85 it proclaimed a members' bill of
rights, including safeguards against arbitrary union discipline," and made
them enforceable by private civil action in federal district courts 
8 7 rather
than by a section 8 unfair labor practice proceeding.
80 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), added by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §158(b) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)-(7) (Supp. IV,
1963).
81 "Members of any labor organization shall have the right to be free from
unreasonable or discriminatory financial demands of such organization, to freely ex-
press their views either within or without the organization on any subject matter
without being subjected to disciplinary action by the organization, and to have the
affairs of the organization conducted in a manner that is fair to its members and in
conformity with the free will of a majority of the members." H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947). (Emphasis added.) Cf. id. at 77 (minority report
denouncing excessive federal control of unions' internal affairs).
82 See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
83 H.R. RE'. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947). The American Civil
Liberties Union had also presented to the House Committee a very detailed bill regu-
lating discrimination in unions. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor on Bills To Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3633-43 (1947).
84 The most restrictive was the American Civil Liberties Union bill originally
proposed to the House Committee in 1947. See Hearings, supra note 83, at 3633-43
(1947). See generally Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regulations of Union Affairs
-II, 44 ILL. L. REv. 631, 636-49 (1949).
8573 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).
86 The bill of rights of the LMRDA bestows on union members equal rights to
vote and attend membership meetings; freedom of speech and assembly; membership
control of dues, initiation fees and assessments; the right to institute court actions;
and procedural safeguards in disciplinary proceedings. LMRDA §§ 101-05, 73 Stat.
522-23 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§411-15 (Supp. IV, 1963). See also LMRDA § 609, 73
Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. IV, 1963).
8773 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §412 (Supp. I, 1959).
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Traditionally, the ultimate function of NLRB jurisdiction has been
to protect "public" rights by removing impediments from the collective
bargaining relationship, the enforcement of private rights being only inci-
dental.88  The policy decision in the LMRDA to have the judiciary rather
than the NLRB redress "private" wrongs committed by unions against
individual members thus comports with this overriding concept.89 The
union's introduction of the employer as the disciplining agent, as in
Miranda, should not by itself alter the essentially private character of the
union-employer dispute so as to remove it from the scope of the LMRDA.90
If the employer's participation in the union discipline should also have a
demonstrable impact on the collective bargaining relationship, accepted
unfair labor practices seem sufficiently broad to permit the Board
to protect the public interest affected.91' Moreover, although the
LMRDA's requirements of notice and fair hearing before union dis-
cipline of individual workers are procedurally oriented, courts obviously
must attribute some substantive content to them to prevent unions from
masking truly groundless discipline behind the formal statutory proced-
ures.92  Hence, if section 7 of the NLRA embodied a right to fair repre-
sentation enforceable in unfair labor practice proceedings, parts of the labor
bill of rights would be redundant 93 and, due to its cumbersome and expen-
sive judicial enforcement, of little value to aggrieved employees. 94 The con-
temporaneous introduction of new unfair labor practices in the Landrum-
Griffin Act 95 suggests that the legislators were critically considering both
judicial and administrative enforcement measures when they chose the
judicial channel in the LMRDA to protect employees from union un-
fairness. 96 If Board jurisdiction were- to exist, it probably would not
88 See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1959); Note, 112 U.
PA. L. REv. 69, 76-78 (1963); cf. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HAgv. L. REv. 851 (1960).
89 See 105 CONG. REc. 6483-84 (1959) (remarks of then Senator Kennedy);
Sherman, The Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 803,
822-23 (1960).
90 See Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Aaron, The Union
Member's "Bill of Rights": First Two Years, Industrial Relations, Feb. 1962, p. 47, at
66; cf. Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 920-22 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists,
286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); Burris v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) ; Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos
Union, 205 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters,
308 F.2d 52, 58-60 (5th Cir. 1962); Beauchamp v. Weeks, 48 L.R.R.M. 3048 (S.D.
Cal. 1961) ; Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs Union, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960).
91 See page 731 infra.
9 2 See Nelson v. Brotherhood of Painters, 41 CCH LAB. CAS. 23870 (D. Minn.
1961) (discipline invalid if charges are unsupported by the evidence).
93 In Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the court found
a violation of the LMRDA on facts closely paralleling the Miranda situation.
94 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
9 5 E.g., § 8(b) (7), which regulated recognitional picketing as an unfair labor
practice. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (7) (Supp. I, 1959).
96The LMRDA (Landrum-Griffin Act) is a product of conflicting aims and
compromise in Congress. Many influential members of both houses strongly opposed
FAIR REPRESENTATION
preempt the parallel LMRDA substantive provisions with their specific
grants of judicial jurisdiction.97 However, the enactment of these judicially
enforceable rights seems incompatible with overlapping jurisdiction in the
Board,98 especially in light of the congressional policy favoring uniform
application of the National Labor Relations Act through the primary
jurisdiction of a centralized administrative agency with specialized pro-
cedures.99 Admittedly, certain factual situations could give rise to either
a judicial action under the LMRDA or a Board proceeding under an
accepted unfair labor practice. 0 But expansion of section 7 to encompass
the previously unannounced unfair practice of union unfair representation
unnecessarily accentuates the conflict.
Still another possible judicial action lies under section 301 Io' to
redress union unfair representation in administering collective bargaining
contracts. In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,10 2 the Supreme Court estab-
lished an important exception to the Board's primary jurisdiction by
upholding state court jurisdiction over a section 301-type action even
though the alleged facts also constituted an unfair labor practice.0 3 The
the direct regulation of the internal affairs of unions in the ultimately enacted bill
of rights, which was adopted by only one vote on the Senate floor after rejection by
the Senate Committee. Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEo. L.J.
226, 227 (1959). See also Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REv. 851 (1960).
97 See Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 922-23 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, 205 F.
Supp. 284, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Aaron, The Union Member's "Bill of Rights".
The First Two Years, Industrial Relations, Feb. 1962, p. 47, at 67. But see Beau-
champ v. Weeks, 48 L.R.R.M. 3048 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
98 See Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union, supra note 97, at 291 (dictum) ; Robert-
son v. Banana Handlers Ass'n, 183 F. Supp. 423, 426 (E.D. La. 1960) (dictum).
09 See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). See generally
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) (Interstate Com-
merce Commission); DAvis, ADMINisTRATivE LAW TEXT § 19.04 (1959); FORKOSCH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 302 (1956).
100 For example, if a union were groundlessly to induce an employer to discharge
an employee for failure to obey union rules, the union would violate both NLRA
§ 8(b) (2) and LMRDA § 101 (a) (5) (arbitrary discipline unlawful).
101 "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
102371 U.S. 195 (1962).
103 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The result in Smith
seems to permit parties to prohibit unfair labor practices in collective bargaining
agreements to afford themselves the option of administrative or judicial remedies.
See 31 FoRDHAm L. REv. 829, 836 (1963). Courts probably could prevent unwarranted
inroads upon the primary jurisdiction of the Board by invoking the doctrine of earlier
circuit court cases that only a "substantive" contractual right, such as one dealing
with seniority or pay, would give the courts jurisdiction under § 301 if the facts
alleged could also support an unfair labor practice. See Textile Workers of America
v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533-34 (4th Cir. 1951), quoted with approval in
Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467,
472 & rL15 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). However, in the
Smith case the contractual provision in question prohibited discrimination based on
union membership in broad terms similar to the statutory prohibition. Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, supra at 196. In Smith, Board and court jurisdiction could
not possibly conflict since the six-month statute of limitations on unfair labor practices
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Court also for the first time extended section 301 jurisdiction to suits by
individual employees, although they were not parties to the collective
agreement."1 4 But the Court reserved the question of an individual em-
ployee's standing to sue under the specific collective agreement involved
in Smith. 0 5 Similar contracts have generally been held not to grant
individual employees even the right to court enforcement of arbitration and
grievance procedures, 0 6 despite the paramount policy favoring nonjudicial
settlement of industrial disputes.'0 7  Parties to collective agreements
probably do not intend to confer upon individual employees the right to
enforce the collective bargaining contract judicially, especially since repeti-
tious or trivial claims would restrict the desired flexibility of union and
employer to adapt the contract to changing circumstances. 08 However,
in Humphrey v. Moore,' 9 the Supreme Court by reaching the merits
assumed that an employee had standing to sue both his union and employer
under section 301. The plaintiff failed to establish breach of a limitation on
the contracting parties' power to integrate seniority lists after a corporate
merger, and also could not sustain his claim that the union breached its
duty of fair representation. The majority opinion discusses the union's
breach of duty to carry out the contract impartially as an element of
plaintiff's contract claim."0 Although an employee's standing to sue his
union under section 301 for unfair administration of the contract without
joinder of the employer may not necessarily follow from Humphrey,"' at
had passed prior to the court action, id. at 197 n.5, and even the NLRB urged that judicial
jurisdiction be sustained, id. at 197-98. The Court refused to indicate the disposition
it would make in a case of actual "conflict" between Board and court jurisdiction.
Perhaps future decisions will restrict Smith to cases in which the procedural posture
similarly precludes Board jurisdiction over the particular action.
104 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 103, at 200. See also General
Drivers Union v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517 (1963) (per curiam).
105 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 103, at 201 n.9.
106 See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d
179, 184 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782, 791-92
(D. Md. 1959); cf. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601,
627 (1956). But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 81-88, 190 A.2d 825
835-39 (1963). See generally Powell, The Bill of Rights-Its Impact Upon Em-
ployers, 48 GEO. L.J. 270, 271 (1959). Even if an employee had standing to sue
under § 301, he might have to exhaust grievance procedures before bringing a court
action. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 103, at 196 n.1 (dictum);
United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 1952)
(dictum) ; cf. Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254
(1962).
107 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960); 111 U. PA. L. REy. 247, 249 (1962).
1O See Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 373-75 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 81-82, 190 A.2d 825,
836 (1963).
:109 Supra note 108.
1 10 84 Sup. Ct. at 368-69. Justices Goldberg, id. at 375-76, and Harlan, id. at
377, attribute to the majority the direct incorporation of protection against unfair
representation into a § 301 breach of contract action, although neither would agree
with this doctrine.
111 Mr. Justice Harlan seems to permit the employee standing to sue the em-
ployer only because the union has refused to enforce the collective rights of employees
against the employer. See id. at 377.
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least those cases in which the employer is a party are now cognizable by
the courts, whether or not the Board should also assume jurisdiction.
Union unfair labor practices have been enforced by the Board since
1947; only now is the Board claiming authority over unfair representation
cases. Although the indirect legislative and judicial authorities available
are not decisive, they tend to refute the proposition that section 7 includes
rights to fair representation. In the absence of conclusive guides, the
consistent pattern of enforcing members' private rights against unions in
the courts looms as an additional factor militating against the Board's
sudden expansion of its section 7 jurisdiction to absorb fair representation
rights without a clear congressional mandate.
C. The Board's Finding of 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) Violations
The Board, in reaffirming its finding of an unfair labor practice, rea-
soned that the union's demand for reduction of the complainant worker's
seniority was not supported by the collective bargaining contract."12  Al-
though the Board did not justify its conclusion that the employer's conduct
encouraged union membership, it probably reasoned that the employer's
obedience to an arbitrary union demand demonstrates union power to
the members of the bargaining unit. Moreover, the Board, having found
no legitimate business purpose for this action, interpreted Local 357,3 and
especially Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, 114 as requiring such
purpose in order to prevent a finding that the employer intended to en-
courage union membership.115 Therefore, the Board found the employer's
alteration of Lopuch's seniority rights a violation of section 8(a) (3), and
the union's activity causing the employer's conduct a violation of section
8(b) (2).
In reversing the Board's decision, Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge
Medina held insufficient the Board's finding that the seniority reduction
was arbitrary discrimination rather than a good faith attempt to execute
the contract terms." 6 Moreover, these judges contended that even arbi-
trary discrimination does not violate section 8(a) (3) unless it is proven
actually to have been intended to encourage or discourage union member-
ship or is apparently based solely on union activity." 7  Neither alternative
was proven in this case. Judge Friendiy's dissent accepted the Board's
112 140 N.L.R.B. at 188.
113 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
114 Id. at 677 (concurring opinion).
13 140 N.L.R.B. at 187-88.
116 Second Circuit opinion at 380, 390. The court merely refused to enforce
the Board order rather than remand the case for further proceedings. Judge
Medina supported this decision on the grounds that even if further proceedings did
prove that the action taken against Lopuch was arbitrary, such a finding would be
insufficient to support an unfair labor practice. Id. at 380. Chief Judge Lumbard,
concurring, concluded that the Board had already been granted sufficient opportunity
to develop facts proving an unfair labor practice and had failed to do so. Id. at 391.
117 Second Circuit opinion at 388, 389, 390.
19641
726 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:711
findings of unjustified discrimination "8 and concluded that since the Board
could have reasonably decided that this discrimination encouraged union
membership and was not justified by a legitimate business purpose, the
court should affirm the Board's finding of an 8(a) (3) violation."
9
Under section 8(a) (3) it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization .. .. *" 120 Section 8(b) (2) prohibits a labor organ-
ization from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of section 8(a) (3). 121 Thus, whether or
not a union's attempt to cause an employer to alter an employee's status
violates section 8(b) (2) depends on whether the desired employer action
would violate section 8(a) (3). The legislative history of section 8(a) (3)
discloses a primary concern with prohibiting employers from encouraging
or discouraging union activities by singling out employees for special treat-
ment on the basis of their participation in these activities.
2 2  Obedient to
this congressional direction, courts have consistently demanded two ele-
ments to establish a violation of section 8(a) (3) : the employer's discrim-
inatory treatment of employees and his motivating purpose to encourage
or discourage union activity. Even if the employer's activity affects union
membership, the employer may escape illegality if his motivation is justified
as a legitimate business purpose.
L23
In the past, two concepts of "discrimination" have appeared. Mr. Jus-
tice Clark has urged in a separate opinion that discrimination in section
8(a) (3) carries its ordinary meaning of distinguishing or differentiating
for any reason whatsoever.124 However, in all cases holding a violation of
section 8(a) (3), the employer's discrimination has been traceable to the
union activities of the discriminatee.
125  The resultant theory, implicit
in the plurality opinion in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB,
26
"R81d. at 393; 394 n.4. Judge Friendly properly disagreed with the majority's
refusal to accept the Board finding that reducing the employee's seniority was an
arbitrary discrimination rather than a good faith attempt to carry out the contract,
since this same court had unanimously affirmed a finding of discrimination in a
previous review of this case. Local 553, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 284 F.2d
861, 863 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated, 366 U.S. 763 (1961) (per curiam).
11) Second Circuit opinion at 397-400.
120 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958).
12161 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958).
2 E.g., S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); S. REP. No. 1184,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) (Senate Report accompanying the original Wagner Act).
323 See text accompanying notes 156-59 infra.
124 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 688-89 (1961)
(separate opinion of Clark, J.) ; see Second Circuit opinion at 399-400 (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
125 See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963); Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 187 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
126 "When an employer and the union enforce the agreement against union mem-
bers, we cannot say without more that either indulges in the kind of discrimination
to which the Act is addressed." Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667, 675 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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is that the statute reaches only discrimination that is based on union mem-
bership. The Second Circuit adopted this limitation in NLRB v. Local
294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,1 27 and it is one ground on which that court
reversed the Board's finding of an 8(a) (3) violation in Miranda.12  Before
Miranda and Local 294, however, in no case had the differing definitions of
statutory discrimination been critical to the outcome, since the challenged
discrimination had always been based on the union activities of the affected
employees. Nevertheless, employer acquiescence in a union demand to
"discriminate" arbitrarily against a random employee without regard to
his union activity may so emphatically demonstrate union power to other
employees that the employer's intent to encourage union membership is
obvious. For example, if the employer knew that the union leaders, before
demanding the discharge of an unpopular worker, had predicted his dis-
missal to members of the bargaining unit, the employer would unavoidably
be alerted to the potential pro-union impact of his special treatment of the
unfortunate worker. Under the Second Circuit's restrictive definition of
"discrimination," however, the employer's acquiescence in this union de-
mand would not violate section 8(a) (3) .'29 As a result, activity which
seems flagrantly to violate the policy of section 8(a) (3) is technically
removed from its scope because an artificial use of language has accidentally
evolved from the cases. A literal and suitable meaning for "discrimination"
in section 8(a) (3)-the making of any distinction or differentiation among
employees-would postpone consideration of the absence of "union" criteria
underlying the discrimination until the assessment of the employer's motive
and the effect of his action. 30
Even if the employer discriminated in Miranda, the decisive question
remains whether the Board reasonably concluded that the employer's pur-
pose was to encourage union membership. The settled rule, recognized
by the Board,' 31 is that "the true purpose or motive of the employer" de-
termines whether he violates section 8(a) (3) .132 Interpretation of the
section has forbidden the motive of encouraging or discouraging not only
127 317 F.2d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 1963). The court refused to hold that an employer
could violate § 8(a) (3) because its acquiescence to union demands demonstrated
union power, since this was not "the kind of discrimination" proscribed by the act
12 8 Second Circuit opinion at 388-90.
129 Furthermore, this court denied that a union can violate § 8(b) (2) by causing
an employer to discriminate unless the employer's action alone would have violated
§ 8(a) (3).
130 Mr. Justice Clark's motive-free definition of discrimination, Local 357, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 688 (1961) (separate opinion), was not
accepted by the Court. Adoption of this definition, however, need not also invoke
Mr. Justice Clark's dilution of the unlawful motive requirement of § 8(a) (3).
13' 140 N.L.ILB. at 186.
132 E.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937) ; NLRB v. Community Shops, Inc., 301 F.2d 263,
266 (7th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. Kohen-Ligon-Folz, Inc., 128 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1942).
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union membership but also active or loyal membership.33 However, the
suggestion in Judge Friendly's dissent that any mere tendency of the em-
ployer's actions to encourage union membership violates section 8(a) (3)
without any showing of an employer intent 1
34 finds little support in the
act's history.13 5 The burden of proving illegal motivation rests on the
General Counsel.
1 3 6 The employer may legally affect the employee's status
for any purpose, no matter how capricious,
137 unless the proscribed en-
couragement may be attributed to him.
If the General Counsel directly proves the employer's motive of en-
couraging union membership, the Board may find an 8(a) (3) violation,
even if the employer's action did not succeed in encouraging union mem-
bership. 3 8 Direct evidence of the employer's unlawful state of mind is
usually difficult to obtain, however, and none was introduced in the Miranda
case. The Board also may infer the employer's motive from his actions.
3 9
The Supreme Court, in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
140 delineated the
Board's power to make these inferences. Radio Officers involved three
Board holdings consolidated for review; all found discrimination by the
employer solely on the grounds of union activity. One employer had
granted a retroactive wage increase only to union members and the others
had disciplined workers for failure to pay union dues and refusal to obey
union work rules. The Supreme Court, affirming findings of employer dis-
crimination to encourage union membership in all three cases, held that
direct evidence of the indispensable element of unlawful employer motive
was not necessary since employer discrimination based solely on union
activity inherently encourages union membership.'
4 ' Extending the com-
mon-law presumption that a man intends the foreseeable consequences of his
conduct, the Court inferred that the employer intended to influence union
activity. 4' The amendments to the National Labor Relations Act which
had invoked more critical review of Board findings were held not to have
withdrawn the Board's power to draw reasonable inferences of motive from
an employer's actions.'
43
133 Local 100, United Ass'n of journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 695 (1963) ;
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
134 Second Circuit opinion at 392 (dissenting opinion).
135 See notes 122 and 132 supra and accompanying text.
136 NLRB v. Ford Radio & Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1958);
NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1956) ; NLRB v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 217 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1954).
137 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937); Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1943) (dictum); cf. Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 NLRB 181, 201 n.37 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
138 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963) (dictum).
139 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961);
NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 588 (1941). The Court is not justified in
reversing the Board merely because it would not have reached the same conclusion
on the evidence. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 542-43 (1943);
NLRB v. Nevada Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942) (per curiam).
140347 U.S. 17 (1954).
'4' Id. at 45.
342 Id. at 44-45.
14 3 Id. at 49-50; see 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), (e)
(1958) ; note 160 infra.
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The Board has refused to apply the Radio Officers standard to find
unlawful employer motivation from the mere granting by an employer of a
union's request to alter an employee's status. This question was first dis-
cussed by the trial examiner in Studebaker Corp.,'
T but was not passed on
by the Board.' 45 Since that time the Board and the courts have attempted
to draw a fine line between legitimate employer acquiescence in a union's
request for adherence to "objective" criteria, such as hiring by geographical
location or skill rating,'40 and unlawful employer acquiescence which enables
the union to use the employer's power over conditions of employment to
encourage loyal union membership by enforcing internal union 
rules.147
In finding a violation of section 8(a) (3), the Board in Miranda rea-
soned that employer acquiescence in an unjustified union demand for arbi-
trary discrimination resembled employer enforcement of union rules and
inherently encouraged union membership-a natural result which the em-
ployer was presumed to have intended.
148 However, although Lopuch
was a union member, the union demand for unfavorable action against him
did not seem related to any union activity. Testimony indicated that the
union action was instigated only upon the complaints of other members
of the bargaining unit. 14 9
If the employer's discrimination had been based solely on the em-
ployee's union activities, as in Radio Officers, the nexus between union
activities and favorable or unfavorable treatment would support the Board's
presumption that the employees would perceive the pattern of employer
'44 110 N.L.R.B. 1307, 1319-27 (1954), aff'd sub nor. Kovach v. NLRB, 229
F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1956). The Trial Examiner stated that the Board may infer
that the employer intended to encourage union membership if employer acquiescence
in the union's demand demonstrates union power and there is no other credible rea-
sonable explanation of the employer's activity. 110 N.L.R.B. at 1327.
'45Id. at 1307 nl. The Board and the reviewing court held the evidence insuffi-
cient to establish a union demand and therefore did not reach the question of the
legality of an employer's acquiescence in such a demand. Id. at 1307; Kovach v.
NLRB, supra note 144, at 145.
146 See, e.g., International Hod Carriers, 135 N.L.R.B. 865, 865-66 (1962) (dis-
crimination in favor of workers already in work force); Bricklayers Union, 134
N.L.R.B. 751 (1961) (discrimination on grounds of geographical distribution);
Daugherty Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 986, 988, 1003-04 (1955) (discrimination in accordance
with apprentice system).
147 "When the insulation of the act between the rights of employment and organi-
zation is pierced by the employer or union for the enforcement of union rules, valid
union security provisos excepted, no direct evidence of specific intent to encourage
membership in a labor organization is required." NLRB v. Brotherhood of Painters,
242 F.2d 477, 481 (10th Cir. 1957). See also NLRB v. Local 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 255 F.2d 703, 705 (3d Cir. 1958) ; NLRB v. Local 1423, United Bhd.
of Carpenters, 238 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1956), enforcing 111 N.L.R.B. 206, 216-17
(1955).
Animated Displays, 137 N.L.R.B. 999 (1962), illustrates the difficulty of applying
this test. The Board split over whether causing an employer to discharge an em-
ployee carpenter rather than a decorator was based on legitimate criteria of skill
or the unlawful standard of local union membership. Compare United Bhd. of Car-
penters, 238 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1956), with Bricklayers Union, 134 N.L.R.B. 751
(1961), for an example of differing conclusions concerning the lawfulness of similar
criteria.
148 140 N.L.R.B. at 189-90; id. at 197 (dissenting opinion).
149 140 N.L.R.B. at 188.
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action and would adjust their union activity accordingly. However, even
accepting the Board's finding in Miranda that the discrimination against
Lopuch was arbitrary rather than a "good faith" interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, 150 any resulting encouragement of union
activity seems less inherently probable than if Lopuch had been singled out
because of his union status. 151 Encouragement of loyal union membership
in Miranda might have tended to flow either from the belief of fellow
workers that Lopuch lost seniority because he was a "bad" union member
or from a demonstration of the union's ability to wield arbitrary power. 5 2
But the Board cited no evidence of either sort of encouragement of union
membership. Indeed, it is equally likely that some workers were completely
unaware of the entire controversy, and the fact that the union's request
originated because of other worker's complaints tends to disprove the em-
ployees' belief that Lopuch's loss of seniority resulted from any problems
he might have had with the union. Therefore, the General Counsel would
have been forced to rely on the subtle presumption that encouragement of
union activity probably results from any employer compliance with arbitrary
union demands. Only from this "proof" of encouragement could the
Counsel have raised the added presumption of employer knowledge of, and
intent to bring about, such encouragement. This attenuated series of in-
ferences seems inappropriate, especially after the Supreme Court in Local
357, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB '1 reemphasized that more than a
mere possibility of union aggrandizement is needed to presume an em-
ployer's unlawful motive from his actions.
To find the employer's unlawful intent to encourage union membership,
the majority of the Board 1- and Judge Friendly 155 stressed the absence of
a legitimate business purpose to justify the employer's discrimination.
Employer compliance with an arbitrary union demand may more frequently
accompany encouragement of union membership than requested discrimina-
tion sanctioned by a provision in the collective bargaining agreement or
required by independent and significant business needs. Nevertheless,
absence of legitimate business purpose only negatively supports the exist-
ence of the proscribed motive, and affirmative proof has been generally
required.,5 6 The proper function of an inquiry into the possible business
150 140 N.L.R.B. at 189-90; see notes 116 and 118 supra and accompanying text.
-151 Several circuit courts have concluded that the presumption of an unlawful
intent under Radio Officers applies only if the employer action is based solely on
union membership. See, e.g., NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954
(5th Cir. 1961); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 83 (9th
Cir. 1960).
152 Second Circuit opinion at 396 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
153365 U.S. 667 (1961). See especially the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, 365 U.S. at 679.
154 140 N.L.R.B. at 187-88; cf. id. at 196 (dissenting opinion).
155 Second Circuit opinion at 399.
156 Cf. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 365 U.S. 667, 680-82 (1961) (Harlan,
J., concurring). One of the few cases that Mr. Justice Harlan concedes as not requir-
ing affirmative proof of motive is Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945), which Congress disapproved as supported by insufficient evidence. See note
160 infra.
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purposes of the employer's discrimination is to determine whether business
advantage really motivated his actions despite the tendency to encourage
union membership already proven to exist. Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Local 357 157 offset the inevitable encouragement of union
membership growing out of a union hiring hall by recognizing the employer's
legitimate business need for a hiring hall. This balancing of interests was
made more explicit in the recent case of NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.585
The Supreme Court held that the legitimate employer interest in continuing
operations during a strike could not excuse the powerful discouragement
of union activity caused by offering twenty years superseniority to replace-
ments and returning strikers. 15 9 But no tendency to influence union mem-
bership had been established in Miranda, and without a prima facie case
against the employer, a defense of legitimate business purpose serves no
function. The lack of legitimate employer business purpose should not
alone sustain a finding of unlawful intent to encourage union membership.
To meet his burden of proof of a section 8(a) (3) violation, the
General Counsel in Miranda, having established discrimination by the
differential -treatment of employee Lopuch, should have proven unlawful
motivation by substantiating either (1) actual motivation to encourage
union membership, (2) employer activity the natural consequence of which
under circumstances known to the employer rendered such encouragement
clearly foreseeable, or (3) an actual encouragement of union membership
that was potentially so significant that the employer should be held to have
anticipated and intended it. The Board's finding of unlawful discrimination
in Miranda is not supported by "substantial evidence on the record con-
sidered as a whole" 160 and the decision, if not the reasoning, of the Court
of Appeals' refusal to enforce the Board order seems desirable.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the Board's finding of a section 8(b) (1) (A) violation in
Miranda presents an appealing mode for rectifying injustices imposed by
157365 U.S. at 684 (Harlan, J., concurring).
158 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
'59 Id. at 228-37.
16049 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). Congress has
restricted the Board's latitude in finding unfair practices. Originally, § 10(e) stated
that "the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence" were con-
clusive. Congress amended this section to require increased Board caution in inferring
unlawful employer motivation and more scrupulous judicial review of Board findings
of fact. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951). Congress
also appended to § 10(c) a provision that no Board order shall require reinstatement
of an employee "discharged for cause." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1958). Prior to these amendments, courts often refrained from overruling
Board inferences of unlawful motivation even though the decisions "strained their
credulity." E.g., NLRB v. Columbia Prods. Corp., 141 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1944);
Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 114, 117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 699
(1942). One of the decisions specifically condemned by Congress for inferring un-
lawful employer intent from insufficient evidence was Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947).
This decision was favorably referred to by Judge Friendly. Second Circuit opinion
at 398.
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unions on their members, it appears to expand the Board's powers beyond
those intended by Congress. Moreover, the Board's assumption of unfair
labor practice jurisdiction over union unfair representation, reinforced by
concepts of preemptive and primary jurisdiction, would severely disrupt
the accepted enforcement responsibility exercised in this area by the courts.
On the other hand, the Board's finding that the Miranda Fuel Company
and the union unlawfully discriminated to encourage union activity merely
extends the enduring uncertainty surrounding sections 8(a) (3) and
8(b) (2). Despite legislative and judicial pronouncements 161 restricting
easy conclusions from tenuous inferences and assumptions, the Board's
resolution in Miranda is not obviously improper. However, adding union
causation of arbitrary employer action to the 8(a) (3) hotchpot may only
hinder the development of stable, reviewable guidelines for findings of
unlawful discrimination.
Michael O'S. Floyd
161 See note 160 ip ra.
